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LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE:
TRUMP S TRADE AUTHORITY AND POLICY
A LOOK AT THE LEGALITY, PRACTICALITY,
PROBABILITY, AND RATIONALITY OF PRESIDENT
TRUMP S PROPOSED TRADE-RELATED ACTION
Noah Glazier*
I.

INTRODUCTION

President Donald Trump made a wide array of comments
regarding trade during his campaign and time as President. These
unconventional to more modest and in-line with past administrations.
Trump declared most of his more extreme trade-related comments
during his time on the campaign trail. For example, Trump claimed
ate or renegotiate the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), 1 and impose 45 percent and 35 percent tariffs
on imports from China and Mexico respectively. 2 President Trump
Organization (WTO) altogether. 3 However, Trump moved away from

*

Mr. Glazier would like to give a special thanks to UC Hastings
Professor Joel Paul, who provided him with invaluable assistance on this
article. He is deeply grateful for Professor
a teacher and a mentor.
1
See e.g., Nick Corasaniti, Alexander Burns & Binyamin
Appelbaum, Donald Trump Vows to Rip Up Trade Deals and Confront China,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
28,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/politics/donald-trump-tradespeech.html?_r=0.
2
See e.g., Paul Wiseman & Joe McDonald, For Americans, Trump's
tariffs on imports could be costly, C HI. TRIB. (December 1, 2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-donald-trump-tariffs20161201-story.html.
3
See e.g., William Mauldin, Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of
World Trade Organization, WALL ST. J.: WASHINGTON WIRE (June 24, 2016),
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these more extreme positions since becoming President. Instead, he
has taken a slightly more cautious approach, while still reserving the
aggressively as needed
practices that harm American citizens.4
complete with the confirmation of United States Trade Representative
(USTR) Robert Lighthizer, allowing the Administration to pursue
believes hurts
5

The goal of this paper is to assess the legality, practicality,
threatened trade measures. Part II.A of the paper discusses the legal
trade actions, including his ability to impose tariff and other non-tariff
barriers to trade, such as quotas on imports from foreign countries.
This part of the paper will also provide an assessment of the legal
challenges, practical constraints, and likelihood of each unilateral trade
measure, including an overview of the following: the relevant
historical application of certain measures, how other countries or
aggrieved parties might respond, and what the Trump administration
city to
unilaterally withdraw from or terminate NAFTA. Part III.C critiques
economic logic.

https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/07/24/trump-threatens-to-pull-u-s-outof-world-trade-organization/.
4
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
THE
PRESIDENT S
2017
TRADE
POLICY
AGENDA,
(2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%
20I%20-%20The%20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf
(The Pr
Robert Lighthizer, the United States Trade Representative).
5
Megan Cassella,
confirmed,
POLITICO.COM
(May
11,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/11/robert-lighthizer-confirmedtrade-rep-238280.
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE: TRUMP S TRADE
AUTHORITY AND POLICY

This section reviews the laws that President Trump may rely on
to make his threatened unilateral trade actions a reality. There are over
nine statutory sections from various trade-related legislations that
could allow the President, often in conjunction with the USTR and
other executive agencies, such as the Department of Commerce (DOC)
and International Trade Commission (ITC), to impose unilateral trade
measures like duties or quotas on imports from foreign countries. The
available U.S. laws are divided into two different groups those that
are conventional or more commonly used and those used much less
frequently (if at all) in the past. 6
since taking office, it is more likely that his Administration will utilize
the more conventional group of unilateral trade mechanisms, although
he will likely use a more aggressive manner than past administrations.7
nature, it is also possible that he will utilize some of the more rare
legislation, which will likely spark more serious legal and economic
concerns.8

There are several U.S. trade laws that have been commonly
utilized by past presidents to help curb unfair foreign trade practices
and to protect American workers, consumers, and producers. The
Trump Administration is already pursuing unilateral trade actions
under some of these statutory provisions and will likely continue to

6

William Clinton, Scott Lincicome, Brian Picone, Richard Eglin, &
William Barrett, Implications of the 2016 US Presidential Election for Trade
Policy,
at
6,
WHITE & CASE LLP
(Sept.
7,
2017),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/implications-of-the-2016-us-55211/.
7
Id. at 6.
8
See id. at 2-3.
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aggressively do so throughout the presidency. 9 These commonly-used
statutory provisions, which primarily involve agency proceedings and
investigations, are further categorized into three different forms of
measures: (1) Antidumping (AD) and Countervailing Duty (CVD)
measures; (2) Section 337 measures; and (3) Section 201 safeguard
measures. 10 These measures have been commonly used by Presidents
of the past, so their usage will likely cause little legal concern.11
trade policy and may be used more aggressively than ever before. 12
Thus, review of these measures is due.
a.

AD and CVD Measures

AD (antidumping duties) and CVD (countervailing duties) are
unilateral trade actions aimed at leveling the international trade
playing field that are commonly used by Presidential
administrations.13 AD duties protect against countries that are
exporting goods at a price that is less than the fair or normal value.14
CVD provide relief from foreign imports that benefit from government

9

See e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ISSUES AFFIRMATIVE
PRELIMINARY ANTIDUMPING D UTY DETERMINATIONS ON BIODIESEL FROM
ARGENTINA
INDONESIA,
Oct.
23,
2017
AND
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/10/us-departmentcommerce-issues-affirmative-preliminary-antidumping-duty-1 (for example,
from January 20, 2017, through October 23, 2017, the Department of
Commerce initiated 73 antidumping and countervailing duty investigations,
which represents a 52 percent increase from the previous year.).
10
See id. at 2; see also U.S. INT L TRADE COMM N, UNDERSTANDING
SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATIONS,
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us_safeguard.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2017).
11
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
12
Id.
13
Id.; see also U.S. INT L TRADE COMM N, UNDERSTANDING
ANTIDUMPING & COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATIONS, USITC Pub. 4540
(June 2015).
14
ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING D UTY H ANDBOOK, supra note
13, at 10.
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subsidies.15 Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is the authority
implementing such duties. 16
individual
AD and CVD orders on various products and countries in 2016, many
of which involved steel imports.17 As of the end of April 2017, the
Trump Administration imposed 16 individual AD and CVD orders on
products including artist canvas, large residential washers, off-theroad tires and stainless steel sheet and strip. 18 For example, the
Administration implemented AD duties on Japanese steel imports
ranging from 206.43% to 209.46% and on Turkish steel imports
ranging from 5.39% to 8.17%. 19 Turkish steel imports were also
subject to CVDs of 16.21%. 20 Due to the regularity of such measures,
it is unlikely that the use of AD and CVD orders by the Trump
administration will cause any significant legal concerns because the
law behind the implementation of such unilateral trade measures is
well established and tested. 21 As a result, the mechanics behind
calculating AD duties and CVDs, which is a very onerous process, are
only briefly discussed here.
Two separate government agencies, the DOC and the ITC, are
involved in setting and administering AD duties and CVDs.22 The
DOC determines whether dumping or actionable subsidizing exists,
and if so, determines the respective duties based on the dumping
margin or amount of subsidy. 23 The ITC determines whether such
dum
injure, or threaten with

15

Id. at 11.
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1673i (2012) (on the imposition of
countervailing duties and antidumping duties).
17
Adam Behsudi,
, POLITICO.COM
(April
24,
2017),
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morningtrade/2017/04/eu-trade-chief-comes-calling-219937.
18
Id.
19
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INT L TRADE ADMIN. FINDING FACT
SHEET (2017), http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheetmultiple-steel-concrete-reinforcing-bar-ad-cvd-051617.pdf.
20
Id.
21
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
22
Id. at 6.
23
Id.
16

SOUTH C AROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL L AW AND BUSINESS

32

VOL. 14.2

material
. 24 Material injury
harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant 25
It should be noted that the Obama administration implemented a
-market economy
(NME) status and its state-owned
These changes have
led to an overall increase in AD duties on Chinese imports, specifically
where Chinese authorities refused to cooperate with the DOC.27
-era trade policies, it is likely that
his Administration will continue pro-duty actions and potentially
utilize or implement other techniques that would broaden the scope
and impact of current AD and CVD measures.28 Other techniques
enterprises.26

r AD and CVD investigations, and increasing the
29
When a country has a non-market economy, normal value cannot
30
Instead, the
normal value is calculated either by a constructed value of a like
product based on the cost of factors in a market economy at the same
level of development or, if such information is not available, by using
the price of a comparable good exported to the U.S. from another
market economy at the same level of development. 31 This process for
calculating a non-market economyhas
ultimately led to higher AD duties being imposed on imports from
China.32 China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001

24

19 U.S.C. § 1676(a) (1994).
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(a) (2016).
26
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 6-7.
30
See Technical Information on anti-dumping, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
31
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1), (c)(2) (2016).
32
See Chad P. Brown, Should the United States Recognize China as a
Market Economy, at 6, PETERSON INST. INT L ECON. (Dec. 2016).
25
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and in the process of doing so, it agreed to carry out a series of steps
designed to open its markets to global trade to act more like a market
economy.33 In
including the U.S., would offici
December 11, 2016. 34 However, the Trump Administration has made
recognize the country as a NME because it allows for higher AD
duties, which in turn ceteris paribus leads to a decrease in Chinese
account deficit with China.35
Also with regards to China, it is possible that the Trump
Administration may direct the DOC to treat deliberate currency
(undervaluation) manipulation as an actionable export subsidy or as
grounds to modify the constructed value determination mentioned
above, which would lead to even higher AD duties.36 However, if this
approach were implemented unilaterally, it would likely face a
plethora of legal challenges, both internationally and domestically. 37
Additionally, as discussed in more detail below, 38 China is not
deliberately undervaluing its currency at the moment and Trump, for
the time being, has completely backed away from his initial threats of
labeling China as doing such. 39
Another way the Trump administration may attempt to sharpen
the teeth of the AD and CVD investigation provisions is by utilizing a
self-initiation process whereby Trump would encourage the DOC to
instigate such investigations sua sponte. 40 Currently, allegedly injured
domestic partners file petitions at the DOC to initiate AD and CVD

33

Id. at 1.
Id.
35
Id. (stating that the reduction in AD duties that would result from
recognizing China as a market economy would likely be a modest increase in
imports due in part to the CVDs that simultaneously accompany most AD
duties on Chinese imports).
36
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
37
Id.
38
See infra
39
See e.g., Uri Dadush, Will America Trigger a Global Trade War, at
2, OCP POLICY C TR. (Feb. 2017).
40
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
34
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for investigations to be instigated sua sponte, or at the direction of the
Secretary of Commerce. 41 This allows the current Secretary, Wilbur
Ross, to target specific imports from specific countries and subject
them to investigations without having to wait for injured parties to file
petitions.42 Notwithstanding the provision that allows for such selfprocess, and doing so will likely be highly controversial. 43 In fact, in
2012, the European Union (EU) attempted to self-initiate AD and
CVD investigations in a similar fashion against Chinese imports, but
ultimately decided otherwise in the face of immense domestic and
international opposition.44
Lastly, the Trump Administration could take a more aggressive
approach to existing AD duty and CVD enforcement by relying more
heavily on the anti-circumvention statute. 45 This statute prohibits the
circumvention of existing AD and CVD orders where there is
insignificant processing of a good or completion of a good in a third
country, or where there is further assembly in the U.S. 46 A recent case
involving the anti-circumvention statute was brought near the end of
argued that China was exporting steel to Vietnam for insignificant
processing to circumvent AD and CV duties that exist on certain
Chinese steel imports.47 A final determination on the matter has yet to
be issued, but within 300 days of publication of the initiation decision,
the DOC will determine whether China circumvented the existing duty
orders.48 This time frame may seem long, but it is more expeditious

41
42
43
44
45
46

See 19 C.F.R. § 351.201(a) (2005).
Id.
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
19 U.S.C. § 1677j (2016); see also C LINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at

7.
47

See e.g., Estelle Tran, US starts China-related anti-circumvention
probes
on
Vietnamese
steel, S&P GLOBAL
(Nov.
2016),
https://www.platts.com/latest-news/metals/houston/us-starts-china-relatedanti-circumvention-probes-21010438.
48
Estelle Tran, Anti-circumvention probes on Vietnamese steel
already benefitting US mills, S&P GLOBAL (Nov. 2016),
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than the typical AD duty investigations, which last anywhere from
280-420 days.49 Additionally, U.S. steel mills already realized
benefits since this initiation, as fearful importers faced with long lead
times continue to cancel orders of the steel from Vietnam currently
under investigation.50 An affirmative determination of circumvention
in this case by the DOC will likely signal a more aggressive approach
to existing AD and CV duty enforcement. 51 It is likely that the Trump
Administration will continue to utilize this anti-circumvention statue,
perhaps even more aggressively, to ensure that existing AD and CVD
orders are effectively enforced and not subject to regulatory arbitrage
by foreign exporters.52
b.

Section 337 Measures

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the use of unfair
competition methods and is arguably the most powerful, cheap, and
expeditious anti-import tool. 53 It allows for the broad remedy of
excluding imports that benefit from such unfair methods of
competition.54 Section 337 has three primary uses: to protect
intellectual property rights, to thwart anti-competitive activities such
as collusion, price fixing, tying, and other forms of predatory pricing,
and to promote consumer fraud protection. 55 Under Section 337, an
ITC administrative judge finds a violation has occurred if a foreign
the
threat or effect of which is to destroy or
industry or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce.56
The administrative judge then sends his findings to the ITC, which

http://blogs.platts.com/2016/11/10/anti-circumvention-vietnam-steel-usmills/.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
52
Id.
53
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2016); see also lecture notes from Professor
Joel Paul, UC Hastings (April 2017).
54
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
55
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2016); see also lecture notes, supra note 53.
56
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2016).
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takes the findings and makes a recommendation to the President. 57 So
long as the President does not veto the findings and recommendation,
they will take effect (i.e., no express presidential approval is needed). 58
The average length of all Section 337 investigations completed in 2017
was just 10.3 months, rendering Section 337 a powerful and
expeditious tool.59
However, because of the way this process is designed, President
Trump has little to no control over the Section 337 process, especially
in the short term.60
administrative judges and the agency itself, which is independent and
bipartisan.61 That being said, Trump is likely to take credit for any
successful Section 337 actions, such as the potential outcome of a case
filed in April 2016 by U.S. Steel against almost all Chinese carbon and
alloy steel products. 62 Trump may also attempt to influence the
Section 337 process in the long-run by appointing sympathetic ITC
administrative judges and commissioners.63 Additionally, it should be
noted that if the ITC does indeed find a violation of Section 337 in the
Chinese carbon and steel alloy products case and imposes the broad
remedy of excluding such imports, such action will almost certainly be
met by opposition from China.64 China will likely claim inter alia that
the action constitutes an impermissible non-tariff barrier to trade in
violation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article
XI, or that the action otherwise violates the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement. 65

57

19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(1)(b) (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(4) (2016).
59
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, SECTION 337
STATISTICS : AVERAGE LENGTH OF INVESTIGATIONS, (Oct. 14, 2017),
https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/337_statistics_average_length_i
nvestigations.htm
60
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
61
Id.
62
Certain Carbon and Alloy Steel Products; Institution of
Investigation, 81 FR 35381 (June 2, 2016); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra
note 6, at 8 (for a further discussion of recent section 337 cases and their
outcomes).
63
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
64
Id. at 6-7.
65
Id. at 9.
58
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Section 201 Safeguard Measures

Another option available to the Trump Administration is to
actively pursue the safeguard investigation measures permitted under
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. 66 While theoretically as potent
as Section 337 measures, these safeguard measures have rarely
resulted in any type of enforcement action or effective remedy. 67
Section 201, which is also administered by the ITC, allows for the
temporary imposition of higher tariffs based on the finding that a surge
or increase in imports
68

However, Section 201 investigations are problematic and difficult,
69
As such,
some definitions and explaining are in order.
The requisite increase in imports must be shown by evidence that
net imports have increased by at least a certain nominal amount or that
they have increased by a certain threshold percentage relative to
domestic production.70
and not less important than any other cause. 71 This is a problematic
standard similar to the Tellabs pleading standard whereby, e.g., a cause
contributing to 33% of the injury along with two other causes each
72
As it is
difficult to compare different inferences of scienter in the Tellabs
context, 73 it is also very difficult to compare different causes of
domestic producer injury, particularly because economic causes and
factors are often inexorably intertwined and cannot be disaggregated. 74

66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(C) (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2016).
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308

(2007).
73

See

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,

standard and the difficulties of making determinations re inferences of
scienter).
74
See lecture notes, supra note 53.
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that must be proven in AD and CVD cases.75
Additionally, Section 201 safeguard measures are subject to
significant limitations. 76 Unlike the AD and CVD orders or Section
337 violation remedies, the Section 201 safeguard measures apply to
all imports from all countries. 77 Thus, the safeguard measures could
not be used to target individual products (e.g. steel) or countries (e.g.
China) and may therefore be seen as less desirable to Trump, who is
primarily considered with bilateral merchandise account deficits. 78
Furthermore, as is the case with Section 337 investigations, Section
201 safeguard measures are implemented and administered by the ITC,
influence the safeguard process especially in the short-term.79
Most Section 201 cases are filed in election years because, in
many ways, Section 201 is ultimately a political tool that allows the
U.S. government to escape the political pressures imposed by
industries seeking protection from a surge of imports.80 For example,
the petition filed by the U.S. steel industry in the important election
year of 2000 was the last Section 201 safeguard imposed on steel. 81
imposed in 2002.82 However, this tariff was promptly terminated in
U.S. failed to show that the Section 201 safeguard measures had
83

This serves as a salient indication that any usage of Section 201
by the Trump Administration will likely be met by immediate WTO

75
76
77
78
79
80

CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See lecture notes from Professor Joel Paul, UC Hastings (April

2017).

81

CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
Kevin K. Ho, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The 2002 Bush Steel
Tariffs, 21 BERKELEY J. OF INT'L LAW 825, 832 (2003).
83
Id. at 839.
82
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challenges from other countries. 84 In order to survive such challenges,
as a result of unforeseen
developments,
as to cause
or threaten serious injury to domestic producers . . . of like or directly
85

In contrast to the more commonly-used statutory provisions
mentioned above, other less used U.S. laws potentially allow Trump
to take broad (and sometimes virtually unfettered) unilateral trade
action against foreign imports. 86 However, because they are
infrequency used, these statutory provisions will likely cause a wide
range of both legal and economic concerns and will be faced with stark
opposition from foreign countries and U.S. industry groups alike. 87
Additionally, to achieve his trade goals using these statutes, the Trump
88

As a result, it is more likely that the Trump administration will opt to
utilize the aforementioned more common and conventional statutes.89
That being said, the more infrequently-used statutes enumerated
below arguably have a higher chance of being utilized under Trump
than under any president before, which is exemplified in part by
separate Section 232 investigations

84

See Binyamin Appelbaum, Experts Warn of Backlash in Donald
, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-policychina.html; see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
85
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1957, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, at 36 [hereinafter GATT].
86
See Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral
Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. P A. J.
INT L ECON. L. 233, 247-48 (1996) (discussing the impact section 301 has on
the President).
87
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
88
See id.
89
Id.
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in his first one-hundred days as President. 90 The less commonly-used
statutory provisions permitting unilateral trade actions discussed
below include: (1) Section 232 national security measures; (2) Section
122 balance-of-payments measures; (3) Section 338 measures; (4)
Section 301 measures; and (5) Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)
and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (EIIPA)
measures. 91 This section concludes with a brief discussion of the
relative likelihoods of each of these measures.

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross to investigate whether certain
classes of imports pose a national security threat to the U.S. 92 In
determining a national security threat, the Secretary and the President
domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements
importation of goods in terms of their
93
quantities and use
They must also recognize the close relation
between national economic welfare and national security, and consider
impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of
individual domestic industries 94 The DOC is required to instigate
Section 23
pon request of the head of any
department or agency, upon application of an interested party , or sua

90

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC Y, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE: ALUMINUM IMPORTS AND THREATS TO N ATIONAL
SECURITY (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/04/27/presidential-memorandum-secretary-commerce; OFFICE OF
THE PRESS SEC Y, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE: STEEL IMPORTS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY (Apr. 20,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/20/presidentialmemorandum-secretary-commerce; see infra
91

CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9-13.
19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (2012); id. at 10.
93
19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (2012).
94
Id.; see also DEP T OF COM., FACT S HEET: SECTION 232
INVESTIGATIONS: THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS ON THE N ATIONAL SECURITY (2017),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2017/04/fact-sheet-section232-investigations-effect-imports-national-security [hereinafter Section 232
Fact Sheet].
92

2017

FRAMEWORK AND CRITIQUE:
TRUMP S TRADE AUTHORITY & POLICY

41

sponte.95 Based on a Section 232 report from Secretary Ross, which
is prepared within 270 days of initiation, Trump is then authorized to
actions as the President deems necessary to adjust the
imports so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national
96 Thus, Section 232 provides President Trump with a tool
that is potentially very powerful, as the statute provides no limit on the
amount of tariffs or nature of restrictions.97
However, utilization of Section 232 in the past has been somewhat
rare, especially since the U.S. joined the WTO in 1995.98 Since 1980,
the DOC has conducted 14 Section 232 investigations, but none of
them resulted in the imposition of significant tariffs or other non-tariff
barriers to trade.99 Since 1995, only two Section 232 probes, one on
steel in 2001 and one on crude oil in 1999, resulted in DOC reports
declining to recommend that the president take action. 100 However,
two notable 1970s Section 232 actions are worth mentioning those
of Presidents Nixon and Ford. Nixon used his authority under Section
232(b) to impose an across-the-board 10 percent surcharge tariff
program in 1971.101 Ford, pursuant to his Section 232(b) powers,
issued a proclamation in 1975 raising licensing fees on petroleum
products and imposing $1-$3/barrel fees on oil entering the U.S.102

95

19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (2012).
Id. at (3)(A)(ii)(II).
97
Id.; see CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 10; see also Noland et al.,
Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign, PETERSON
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, Sept. 2016, at 9.
98
See A National Security Argument on Trade, STRATFOR ENT.,
LLC (Apr. 21, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.stratfor.com/node/279276
96

has cond
99

See Bureau of Indus. and Sec., Section 232 Investigations: The
Effect
of
Imports
on
the
National
Security
(2016),
http://www.bis.doc.gov/232; Section 232 Fact Sheet supra note 94.
100 See
Imports of Iron Ore and Semi-Finished Steel on the National Security (2001);
rt Admin., The Effect on the National
Security of Imports of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products (1999).
101 Noland et al., supra note 97, at 9-10; see also, C LINTON ET AL., supra
note 6, at 10.
102
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 10.
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ability to set minimum prices for crude oil absent
congressional approval. 103
So far in his time as President, Trump has directed Secretary Ross
to begin two separate Section 232 investigations one on steel imports
and one on aluminum imports, both were initiated in April 2017.104
105

According to Chad Brown, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute,
hen you go down this path of reverting to the national security
106
exception, it really is
decisions to instigate these probes were made about a week apart in
late April, just as he was approaching the 100-day mark of his
presidency, perhaps as the result of political and internal pressure to
live-up to some of his campaign promises to get tough on trade. 107
not be completed until early
2018 based on the 270 day timeline, so any Section 232(b) action by
President Trump will not occur until that time. 108
practical and legal constraints, especially if they result in the
imposition of tariffs or other non-tariff barriers.109 The biggest

103

See Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 9499, 89 Stat. 481(1975); id.
104 See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC Y, supra note 90; see e.g., Doug
Palmer & Matthew Nussbaum,
, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2017, 9:25 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/26/trump-aluminum-imports-trade237665.
105
See Doug Palmer, Matthew Nussbaum, supra note 104.
106 Id.
107
Id.
108
Section 232 Fact Sheet supra note 94; see also, Ana Swanson, Will
2018 Be the Year of Protectionism? Trump Alone Will Decide, New York
Times
(Jan.
3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/
us/politics/2018-trump-protectionism-tariffs.html (as of January 6, 2018, the
reports have not been filed, but the deadlines are soon approaching; the
Commerce Department must submit its reports on January 15, 2018 and
January 21, 2018 for the steel and aluminum investigations, respectively).
109
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
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practical constraint, as alluded to above, is the risk that such measures
will result in retaliatory actions from other countries. 110 This risk is
especially salient with regard to China, who has demonstrated both the
willingness and ability to effectively retaliate in the past (e.g., in
111
The
perverse economic repercussions that may result serve as significant
practical limitations to such action, and will likely deter a mindful
Trump Administration from engaging in overly aggressive unilateral
Section 232 actions.112
face challenges, both in U.S. courts and at the WTO. 113
Notwithstanding the fact that U.S. courts strongly defer to the
exe
how such domestic cases may play out in the Section 232 context. 114
For example, aggrieved parties bringing claims in U.S. courts might
ion 232(b) to
impose import restrictions violates the separation of powers principle
and, more specifically, the non-delegation doctrine. 115 While the nondelegation doctrine has not been explicitly applied by the Supreme
Court since 1935, it is still good law.116 In essence, the doctrine states
that whenever Congress delegates authority to the executive branch,
such delegation is only permissible when Congress provides an
accompanying intelligible principle to guide the executive branch on
how to exercise such authority. 117 Thus, it could be argued that
Section 232 gives the President unfettered discretion and fails to

110

Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114 Id. at 10.
115 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
537 (1935); also see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935).
116 See A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495, 537; also see,
Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. 388, 420-21.
117 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., at 530; Panama Refining Co., at
429-30.
111
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provide the requisite intelligible principle; therefore,
unconstitutionally undermines the non-delegation doctrine. 118

it

Additionally, foreign countries targeted by any Section 232(b)
actions will almost certainly file complaints with the WTO pursuant to
GATT Article XXIII, claiming that their legitimate expectations of
trade benefits have been nullified or impaired by the Section 232(b)
action.119 However, the U.S. could cite to the national security
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interest taken in time of war or other emergency in international
120
In turn, foreign countries would likely argue that the
national security exception does not apply in this context, as there is
stake.121 Taking aluminum as an example, such countries might argue
that U.S. national security requirements for aluminum (i.e., the
amounts of aluminum required by national defense and homeland
security) are entirely supplied by U.S. domestic production, and
therefore, imported aluminum simply does not impair U.S. national
security.122
They may also argue that international trade in aluminum products
strengthens, rather than impairs, the U.S. economy; citing the fact that
-

118

See Tim Meyer,
hurdle: The US Constitution, The Conversation (Aug. 15, 2017),
http://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-to-withdraw-from-nafta-may-hit-ahurdle-the-us-constitution-81444
119 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 10.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122 See e.g.,
Republic of China, U.S. Department of Commerce Section 232 Investigation
on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on U.S. National Security (June 22,
2017) (according to this testimony, the amount of aluminum required by
national defense is small, accounting for only 1.7 percent of the U.S. total
domestic consumption of aluminum and less than 4 percent of the U.S. total
domestic supply of aluminum).
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in 2016
123

XXI national security exception, in this context, will likely face
opposition from the WTO itself. 124 Allowing this exception would
-forprocess.125 That being said, the Trump administration emphasized that
the U.S. would make its decision concerning the Section 232
determination; without considering any potential violation of WTO
rules.126

Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to
-ofby imposing temporary import surcharges, quotas, or both. 127 Such
import surcharges cannot exceed fifteen percent, in proportion to the
estimated value of the goods concerned. 128 The surcharge and quota
restrictions are limited to last 150 days, absent a congressionally
approved extension.129 Pursuant to Section 122, the temporary quota
restriction can only be exercised
agreements to which the United States is a party permit the imposition
of quotas as a balance-ofonly to the extent

123
124
125
126

Id.
See CLINTON, ET AL., supra note 6, at 11.
Id.
See Palmer and Nussbaum, supra note 104, (quoting Secretary Ross,

our view as to who's violating those rules
127
128
129

and the WTO will do what they

Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. Ch. 12 § 12, § 2101, et seq.
Id.
Id.
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the temporary fifteen percent surcharge, in proportion to the estimated
value of the goods concerned. 130
Section 122 allows the President to impose such temporary
restrictions on a non-discriminatory basis
131

Otherwise, the statute permits the President to specifically target
countries which the U.S. has a large trade deficit with. 132 Given
focus on bilateral merchandise trade deficits, if he were to utilize
Section 122, President Trump would likely opt for the latter option and
target China, Germany, Mexico, and Japan specifically because these
countries run the largest bilateral surpluses with the U.S. and are,
therefore, his largest concerns. 133 While President Trump could take
action pursuant to Section 122, absent a finding of a threat to national
security, the duration and size of the restrictions would be severely
limited by the statutory constraints.
Additionally, as is this case with the less-commonly used statutory
measures discussed herein, Section 122 actions would likely spur legal
challenges in both the U.S. courts and in a WTO tribunal. Reading the
face of the statute and relying on its plain meaning, potential plaintiffs
could argue that it would be impossible for the U.S.
and serious balance-ofexchange rate regime since current account deficits are offset by
capital account surpluses.134 In turn, the U.S. would likely cite the
historical origins of Section 122
-ofaccount deficits.135 Additionally, the U.S. would likely argue that the
of Section 122, which is not what Congress intended.
Section 122 actions would also likely encounter challenges from
the WTO. Any use of Section 122, to specifically target countries
130

Id. at § 201(a)(3)(C).
Id.
132
Id. at § 201(d).
133 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.
134 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11; see also, C LINTON
supra note 6, at 11.
135
See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11.
131

ET AL.,
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which the U.S. has a large trade deficit with, would almost certainly
136 As a
violate GATT
result, targeted countries would likely file GATT Article XXIII
dispute settlement process would take longer than the 150-day
restriction.137 As a potential defense to a WTO challenge, the Trump
administration may cite GATT Article XII, which, under certain
circumstances, permits contracting parties to restrict imports in order
to safeguard their balance-of-payments.138 However, the U.S. can only
properly utilize this defense if the IMF finds that it is experiencing
sufficient balance-of-payment difficulties, but countries are rarely
found to experience these difficulties.139

140 Section 338 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 provides the President with broad tariff-setting authority

fifty percent, in proportion to the estimated value of the goods
concerned, on imports
against U.S. commerce. 141 Section 338 authority is triggered when
enforced upo

136

GATT art.1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5) and (6), 55 U.N.T.S. 196.
See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11; see also, CLINTON ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 11.
138 GATT art.7, supra note 85, at 12.
139
GATT art. 15, supra note 85, at 24-25; see also, Chapter 3
Quantitative Restrictions, M INISTRY FOR ECON., TRADE AND
INDUS.,http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/gCT0003e.pdf.
140 See John Veroneau and Catherine Gibson,
Forgotten Power To Raise Tariffs, L AW 360 (Dec. 14, 2016, 1:53 PM EST),
https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2016/12/law360_the_presidents_long_for
gotten_power_to_raise_tariffs.pdf.
141
The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1930).
137

SOUTH C AROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL L AW AND BUSINESS

48

VOL. 14.2

142

Section 338 also allows the President to
completely block certain imports from countries that continue to
in
143
proportion to the estimated value of the goods concerned.
Section
338 investigations may be instigated as deemed necessary or via
private party petitions to the ITC. 144
Despite the theoretically immense tariff authority that Section 338
provides the President, its lack of use, coupled with substantial
pragmatic and legal constraints, render it unlikely to be used as a tool
for trade. Section 338 has never been used to impose duties on foreign
imports. In fact, no public record relating to Section 338 was
uncovered since a telegram from then-Secretary of State Dean
Acheson mentioned it in 1949. 145 As a result, there are currently no
regulations regarding Section 338 presidential proclamations. 146 The
of the Trade Act of 1974.147 Even if President Trump utilized Section
338, despite the fact that it is functionally defunct and forgotten, such
use would likely be met with immense pushback in American courts.
Injured parties would likely, among other things, make non-delegation
doctrinal arguments such as those discussed in the Section 232 context
above.148 The injured parties may also argue that the Uruguay Rounds
Agreements Act, which formally adopts the GATT, supersedes
Section 1338 and, therefore, renders it void. 149
150

As mentioned above, Section 1338
requires a finding of intercountry trade-related discrimination that

142

19 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1930); see also, Veroneau and Gibson, supra
note 140, at 1; see also, C LINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
143
19 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1930).
144 See Veroneau and Gibson, supra note 140, at 1.
145 Id. at 2.
146
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
147 Id.
148 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
149 See Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1143.
150
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
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results in an impact disparately effecting the U.S. 151 GATT Article I
obliges countries to treat each other on an MFN basis. 152 Therefore,
trade-related discrimination is difficult to prove whenever the target
country is a WTO member. 153 In fact, the principal idea and goal
behind the GATT is twofold; countries both promote nondiscrimination and facilitate comparative advantage by preventing
154
Thus, it
seems that GATT currently serves the primary purpose of this
antiquated statutory provisio to thwart discriminatory foreign trade
practices (and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, discussed in the
sub-section below).
Another limitation of the statute stems from the fact that Section
1338 authorizes the ITC, and not the President or any other agency, to
occurred.155
Therefore, any unilateral actions by the President would arguably only
be permissible only after such a determination by the ITC (which is an
independent and bipartisan agency). Section 1338 is, in a way,
similarly limited to the Sections 1337 and 2132 measures, as discussed
earlier, which are also subject to ITC involvement. 156 Finally, any
Section 1338 actions will be met by immediate WTO challenges.
Targeted countries could claim, among other things, that the U.S.
violated GATT Article II by failing to bind itself to its tariff
concessions.157 This Article II argument is available to targeted
countries anytime the U.S. unilaterally raises tariffs. 158 Absent some
permissible exception, a WTO panel will likely hold adversely to the
U.S.

151

See 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(2).
GATT art. 1, supra note 85.
153 See Clinton et al., supra note 6, at 9.
154 See generally GATT art. 1, supra note 85 (explaining that the treaty
seeks mutually advantageous agreements, which reduce barriers to trade).
155 19 U.S.C. § 1338(g); see also C LINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 10.
156 19 U.S.C. § 1338 (2016).
157 See GATT, art. 2, supra note 85.
158
Id.
152
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the United States
Trade Representative (hereinafter USTR), at the direction of the
President, to respond to unfair trade practices by taking a wide variety
of retaliatory actions, including increasing tariffs or other import
restrictions.159
-commonly
cited statutes, the Trump administration referenced the statute in the
2017 National Trade Policy Agenda. 160 Section 301(2411) prescribes
both mandatory and discretionary USTR action. 161 Section 301(a)
which the USTR must take when a state
violates a U.S. trade agreement. 162 Conversely, Section 301(b)
which the USTR may take if it is
U.S. commerce. 163
broadly.164 State actions can be
nt with, the international
165

den[y] national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States
166
goods, services, or inves
If the USTR finds such

conduct.167 Thus, Section 301 gives the President, through the USTR,
broad authority to retaliate against unfair foreign trade practices (e.g.,
market access restrictions or other U.S. export obstacles) by imposing

159
160

4.

161
162
163
164
165
166
167

19 U.S.C. § 301 (2016); 19 U.S.C. §§2411-2420 (2016).
See
supra note 4, at 319 U.S.C. § 301 (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (2016).
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A) (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5) (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (2016).
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a wide range of retaliatory actions, including tariff increases or
quotas.168
The retaliatory actions, that Section 301(c) authorizes, include the
ability to: withdraw or suspend the benefits of certain trade agreement
concessions; impose duties or other import restrictions for as long as
the USTR determines appropriate; withdraw, limit, or suspend
preferential duty treatment; and enter into binding agreements that
obligate offending foreign countries to eliminate or phase out their
unfair foreign trade practices.169 These authorized actions may be
taken on either a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against targeted
foreign countries based on their unfair practices. 170 Section 301
investigations may by instigated by the USTR in response to private
r
by its own
volition.171 As a result, Section 301 has historically served as an
effective way for private parties, who have no right of action under the
etition the U.S.
government to take action. These petitions have resulted in WTO
hearings instead of per se retaliation.172
While Section 301 potentially provides the USTR and the
President with broad authority to respond to unfair trade practices, its
historical usage and success rate suggest that the tool may be less
powerful than it seems. 173 Historically, the U.S. has been more
successful using multilateral means to get trade concessions than using
Section 301 as a retaliatory tool. 174 Based on a study comparing a total
of 189 trade actions between 1975 and 2000, the U.S. was thirty-four
168

19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420; see also C LINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at

12.
169

19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(3)(A).
171
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 12.
172
See lecture notes, supra note 53 (noting that the establishment of the
WTO, Section 301 has not produced any unilateral sanctions).
173 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
174
See
work? History says no
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/07/willtrumps-unilateral-trade-approach-work-history-saysno/?utm_term=.34e5881b7ca0.
170
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percent less likely to secure targeted country concessions when it
utilized the unilateral Section 301 route over multilateral channels. 175
This is primarily because targeted countries, particularly Japan,
viewed resisting unilateralism as beneficial in the long-run. 176 Japan,
and other countries, feared that conceding to such retaliation would
incentivize the U.S., and perhaps other well-established, developed
nations, to impose similar threats and unilateral coercion in the
future.177 On the other hand, when countries concede to legitimate
concessions through the same legitimate multilateral means in the
future.178 Thus, Section 301, despite providing a facially potent threat
of retaliation, may prove to be less effective than it seems.
make
its utilization less likely and effective, even if it were utilized. The
U.S. agreed, in the Statement of Administrative Action accompanying
the Uruguay Agreements Act, not to unilaterally invoke Section 301
prior to an affirmative WTO determination.179 Therefore, the U.S. is
precluded from imposing Section 301 actions without first filing a
complaint with the WTO and receiving a favorable, merit-based
determination
timeconsuming process. However, such a restriction only covers Section
301 actions taken in connection with claims covered by existing WTO
agreements, and as a result the USTR could initiate Section 301 against
WTO agreements.180 Th

175

is rather weak

See Krzysztof J. Pelc, Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its
Role in U.S. Trade Policy, 1975 2000, 64 INT L ORG. (Jan. 1, 2010),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/internationalorganization/article/constraining-coercion-legitimacy-and-its-role-in-ustrade-policy-19752000/28776DB90B9BD03EA6728E723157CF6E.
176 See generally, id.
177 Id.
178
Id.
179 H.R. 5110, 103rd Cong. (1994); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note
6, at 13; Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11.
180 H.R. 5110, 103rd Cong. (1994); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note
6, at 13.
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in practice as the USTR has been disinclined to challenge any such
practices that are not covered by WTO agreements. 181
If President Trump and USTR Lighthizer were to unilaterally
impose Section 301 actions, either by alleging that the targeted
discriminatory practice was outside WTO agreements or by ignoring
the WTO entirely, such actions would be subject to immediate legal
challenge.182 For example, as discussed above vis- à-vis some of the
aforementioned statutory provisions, targeted countries would bring
GATT Article XXIII nullification and impairment claims to the
WTO.183 In a 1999 case, the EU filed a WTO complaint against the
U.S. for its use of Section 301. The WTO determined that the U.S.
had violated its WTO commitments by failing to pursue WTO actions
instead of engaging in Section 301 unilateralism. 184 This case serves
as important precedent and foreshadows the fact that the Trump
administration will likely lose any WTO challenges to its unilateral use
of Section 301, especially if the targeted action is covered by WTO
agreements (which it almost certainly would be, given the breadth of
185

Aside from these legal hurdles and procedural limitations, a
salient practical constraint on Section 301 is the risk of retaliatory
action by targeted countries in lieu of legal challenges, and the
deleterious economic consequences that would ensue. Section 301
actions may indeed spur a tit-for-tat retaliatory trade war as seen in the
1930s,186 as targeted countries decide to unilaterally retaliate back
against the U.S. using the same arguments the Trump administration
had offered toward WTO applicability. 187 This could potentially
stimulate a dangerous self-perpetuating cycle that could plausibly
181

See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
Id.
183 Id.
184
See DS 152, United States
Sections 301 310 of the Trade Act
1974,
WTO
(1999),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds152_e.htm; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
185 Id.
186
See e.g., Enda Curran, Trump Rhetoric Raises Specter of 1930s-Style
Trade
War,
BLOOMBERG
(January
6,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-06/trump-rhetoric-raisesspecter-of-1930s-style-trade-war-with-asia.
187
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
182
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cripple the global economy. 188 While the Trump administration
purportedly remains indifferent to adverse WTO rulings, it is certainly
sensitive to retaliation, especially targeted at politically important
goods such as Florida oranges.189
5.

TWEA AND IEEPA MEASURES190

The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), enacted as the
U.S. was entering World War I, delegates expansive authority to the
President, allowing him to freeze and seize foreign assets, and
e during times of war.191
192

While President Roosevelt
was able to successfully invoke Section 5(b) of the TWEA during the
heart of the Great Depression to declare a national emergency and
order a bank holiday, 193 the scope of the statute has since been more
limited by Congress. In 1976, Congress amended the TWEA to limit
its application more directly to times of war. 194 Another significant
constraint is that the TWEA does not specifically authorize the
President to increase tariffs. Instead, it vaguely permits him to
195
Thus, invoking the TWEA to
increase tariffs would generate a plethora of legal challenges. 196 These
challenges would
context and in part on an interpretation of whether Congress intended
the TWEA to be used only during times of congressionally declared

188

See e.g., Curran, supra note 186.
Id.
190
For a compressive review of both measures, see Chapter 5:
Authorities Relating to Political or Economic Security; Committee on Ways
and
Means
(2010
Edition),
251-266,
available
at:
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111WPRT63130/pdf/CPRT111WPRT63130.pdf.
191
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 §§ 5(a)-(b), as amend. (1976);
see also, Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11-13; see also, C LINTON ET AL., supra
note 6, at 14.
192
Chapter 5, supra note 190, at 251.
193 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 12.
194 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
195 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 § 5(b), as amend, (1976).
196
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
189

2017

FRAMEWORK AND CRITIQUE:
TRUMP S TRADE AUTHORITY & POLICY

55

war (as opposed to unauthorized military action, e.g., the ongoing
197

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
(IEEPA), which further limits the applicability of the TWEA, similarly
authorizes the President to freeze and seize foreign assets and
198 However, unlike the TWEA,

199

Importantly, President Trump may only invoke
his IEEPA authority if a national emergency has been declared under
the National Emergencies Act. 200 Therefore, in the IEEPA context,
President Trump could not declare an actionable national emergency
sua sponte, which imposes a significant constraint on its usage.
Additionally, while the IEEPA does not require consent from
Congress, the act mandates that the President consult with Congress
and provide periodic reports explaining and justifying his actions. 201
As a result, if President Trump invokes his IEEPA powers to engage
in actions adverse to politically important constituents, Congress will
likely attempt to pass limiting legislation, which would require twoNever
extensive. Historically, the IEEPA has been invoked by Presidents to
impose other export controls such as sanctions and embargoes. 202
Since its inception, it has been utilized by past Presidents as a powerful
tool at least sixteen times. 203 For example, during the Iranian Hostage
Crisis, President Carter called upon his IEEPA powers in Executive
Order 12170 to freeze about $8 billion of Iranian government assets

197

Id.
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977; see
also, Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11-13; see also, C LINTON ET AL., supra
note 6, at 14.
199
Id.
200 See Chapter 5, supra note 190, at 251.
201 Id. at 252.
202 Id. at 252-63.
203
Id.
198
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held in the U.S.204 The IEEPA was also used in 1985 by President
Reagan to block all exports and imports to and from Nicaragua in
205
In 1997,
President Clinton used his IEEPA authority to block Sudan
government property and prohibit certain transactions due in part to
206
Importantly, the
106 of the USA Patriot Act, which permits the blocking of assets
207 That being said, IEEPA
has never been used specifically to combat trade deficits. 208
Given its scope, applicability, and historical usage, President
Trump could likely use the IEEPA provisions to prohibit trade with
foreign nations actively involved in terrorism.209 In fact, Presidents
Clinton, Bush, and Obama all used the IEEPA for that very purpose. 210
imports from China or Mexico on economic grounds, for example,
would require a very liberal interpretation of the statute.211
Additionally, use of either the TWEA or IEEPA will probably be met
by legal challenges filed at the WTO by targeted countries.212 Because
these statutory provisions involve national security concerns, the U.S.
would likely cite the GATT Article XXI national security exception in
response to any nullification and impairment WTO challenges à la
Section 232.213 However, depending on the circumstances of the
national emergency, the WTO may be reluctant to recognize such an
exception in this context due to the same institutional concerns
discussed vis-à-vis Section 232 above. 214 Furthermore, as is this case
with utilization of any of the aforementioned unilateral trade action

204

Id. at 254.
Id. at 255-56.
206 Id. at 261.
207
Id. at 251-52.
208
Id.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 241, 254.
211
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
212 See id. at 14.
213 See id.
214 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 232;
see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
205
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vehicles, the risk of retaliation and subsequent consequences serves as
a significant practical constraint on such measures.215

Given the legal and practical constraints and framework analysis
discussed above, the aforementioned less commonly used statutory
provisions have the following relative likelihood of use by the Trump
administration:
IEEPA > Section 122 >
216
TWEA > Section 338.
As previously discussed, the Trump
administration has already initiated two Section 232 probes, one on
steel and one on aluminum. 217
Additionally, after explicitly
referencing Section 301
Agenda, which refers to
powerful lever to encourage
foreign countries to adopt more market-friendly policies 218 the
Trump administration officially instigated a Section 301 investigation
of China in August 2017. 219 President Trump or his administration
have not yet meaningfully mentioned the other less common measures
and laws.

In addition to threatening other countries with duties and other
import restrictions, Trump has repeatedly claimed, including in his
Contract with the American Voter
Treasury
Secretary to lab
Trump would impose appropriate countervailing duties to combat such

215
216

See CLINTON, ET. AL, supra note 6, at 14.
With Section 232 being the most likely and Section 338 the least

likely.
217

See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 232.
THE PRESIDENT S 2017 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 4, at 4.
219 See Robert Lighthizer, USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301
Investigation of China (Aug. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiationsection.
218
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practice.220 Since his time as President, Trump has completely
reversed himself on this position. 221
currency manipulation criteria and reporting processes are discussed
below. These criteria and report determination mechanisms remain
propensity to flip-flop
222
on important issues.

Two different U.S. laws, Section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,223 and Section 701 of the Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 224 direct Secretary of
the Treasury Steven Mnuchin to periodically analyze the
macroeconomic and exchange rate polices of major U.S. trading
partners. Section 3004 mandates annual reporting, and Section 701
mandates biannual reporting. 225 The goal of the reports is to determine
purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or
226

Section 701 provides Secretary Mnuchin with three criterion for
identifying currency manipulation by considering whether countries
have: (1) a bilateral merchandise trade surplus with the U.S. exceeding

220

Contract with the American Voter
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/CONTRACT_FOR_THE_VOTER.pdf; see,
e.g., Corasaniti, et. al., supra note 1; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at
administration the US Treasury Department will designate China as a currency
es appropriate
221

See, e.g., Matthew Nussbaum, Trump shifting positions at breakneck
pace,
POLITICO,
Apr.
12,
2017,
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/donald-trump-shifts-positions-natohealth-care-china-237175.
222
See, e.g., id.
223 22 U.S.C. § 5305 (2016).
224 19 U.S.C. § 4421 (Supp. 2017).
225 22 U.S.C. § 5305(a); 19 U.S.C. § 4421(a)(1) (2016).
226
22 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2016).
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ematically intervened to depress their currencies.227
While China, running by far the greatest merchandise trade surplus
with the U.S. of approximately $356 billion in 2015, certainly satisfies
the first criterion, it fails to satisfy the other two criterion.228
net current account surplus is approximately in excess of only 2.4% of
229

Additionally, regarding the third criterion, China is not systemically
intervening to depress its currency at the moment. 230 In fact, China
recently has been selling U.S. treasury bonds at a record pace in an
231
Currently, just two countries,
Taiwan and Switzerland, are actively intervening to depress their
currencies; however, they both fail to meet the $20 billion bilateral
goods deficit benchmark. 232
Even if China were to satisfy the three criteria or Secretary
Mnuchin otherwise labeled the country a currency manipulator,
neither Section 3004 nor Section 701 authorize President Trump to
impose countervailing duties, or any other import restrictions, as a
response.233 Instead, Section 701 merely directs President Trump,
urge implementation
of policies to address the causes of the undervaluation of its
currency 234 Under Section 701(c)(1), the President is entitled to
engage in limited forms of remedial action if such offending countries
fail to adopt appropriate corrective policies within one year of the

227

Dadush, supra note 39, at 2; see also 19 U.S.C. §
4421(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I-III) (2016).
228
See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.
229
Id.
230 See generally, id.
of currency manipulation).
231
See, e.g., Evelyn Cheng, China is working hard to support its
currency it sold US government bonds for six straight months, CNBC (Jan.
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/19/china-is-working-hard-to-supportits-currency--it-sold-us-government-bonds-for-six-straight-months.html.
232 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.
233 See 22 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2016); see also 19 U.S.C. § 4421(c)(1)(A)(D) (2016); see also C LINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
234
19 U.S.C. § 4421(b)(1) (2016).
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commencement of the bilateral engagements.235 However, none of
these remedial actions permit President Trump to increase tariffs or
impose any other non-tariff barriers to trade. 236 As a result, even if the
Trump Administration were to label China a currency manipulator, it
would not be able to increase duties or otherwise restrict Chinese
imports as a response. 237 To do so, President Trump would have to
invoke one of the aforementioned U.S. laws permitting unilateral trade
action.238

President Trump has repeatedly publicly censured NAFTA
calling it the
and
239
Notwithstanding his purported dislike
for the free trade agreement, President Trump has since announced that
he will not be terminating the agreement but instead renegotiating it.240
The Trump Administration formally began this renegotiation process
on May 18, 2017, when it sent a letter to Congress stating its intentions
to do so.241 Despite this formal indication of intent to renegotiate, the
discussion here focuses on whether President Trump has the authority
to unilaterally withdraw from or terminate NAFTA.242

235

19 U.S.C. § 4421(c)(1) (2016).
For a list of permissible remedial actions under this section, see 19
U.S.C. §§ 4421(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2016).
237
See id.
238 See Trade Act of 1974 § 201.
239
For a list of all the negative statements Trump has said about
NAFTA, see generally
Here are all the terrible things
President Trump has said about NAFTA
before deciding to stick with it
NY
DAILY
NEWS
(Apr.
27,
2017),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/terrible-president-trump-naftaarticle-1.3107104.
240 See, e.g., id.
241 See
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTA%20Notificati
on.pdf.
242 For a compressive discussion of the NAFTA termination process,
see Jon R. Johnson, The Art of Breaking the Deal: What President Trump Can
, C. D. Howe Institute (Jan. 2017),
236
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a.

Terminating NAFTA

to unilaterally terminate NAFTA is briefly reviewed first. NAFTA
Article 2205 provides that a Party (i.e. the U.S., Canada, or Mexico)
may withdraw from the agreement six months after providing
sufficient notice.243 However, merely giving such notice does not give
effect to such a withdrawal. Instead, such a withdrawal can be
Congress have joint authority

244

U.S. trade agreements such as NAFTA are: (1) negotiated by the
USTR, (2) signed and approved by the President through his foreign
affairs power, and importantly (3) approved and implemented by
Congress through congressionally enacted legislation. 245
involvement is constitutionally imperative, since trade agreements like
NAFTA directly affect U.S. commerce, the regulation of which is
246

Thus, withdrawal from NAFTA can only have effect if Congress
contemporaneously repeals its implementing legislation, which is
codified in the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act.247 Therefore, President Trump could not unilaterally withdraw
from NAFTA.
Some legal experts have argued that President Trump has the
authority to unilaterally withdraw from NAFTA pursuant to the
Trade Act of 1974. 248 However, this argument is misguided and

https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mix
ed/Commentary_464.pdf.
243
See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2205, Dec. 6, 1983.
244 Johnson, supra note 242, at 1.
245
See id. at 4.
246
See id.
247 See id.
248 See, e.g., Warren H. Maruyama & Robert D. Kyle, President Trump
Will Have Broad Presidential Authority to Terminate Trade Agreements and
Impose Punitive Duties on U.S. Trading Partners, HOGAN LOVELLS (Nov.
2016),
https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-next-presidentwill-have-broad-authority-to-terminate-free-trade-agreements-and-imposepunitive-duties-on-foreign-countries.
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incorrect. Section 125(a) states that every trade agreement entered into
by the U.S. must contain a provision allowing the U.S. to withdraw
after giving appropriate notice.249 However, this sub-section is silent
thdraw from trade
250
agreements.
he President may at any time
terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation made under this
emphasis added).251 Thus, pursuant to Section 125(b),
President Trump may have the authority to unilaterally withdraw from
certain NAFTA-related proclamations, but not from NAFTA as a
whole.
Importantly, a number of NAFTA provisions were implemented
through presidential proclamation rather than explicit enumeration in
the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
(Implementation Act).252 For example, Section 201(a)(1)(A) of the
Implementation Act enables the P
modifications
253
or continuation of
and Section 202(q) permits the
President to proclaim certain matters respecting rules of origin.254
Pursuant to, inter alia, the various sections of the Implementation Act
authorizing NAFTAClinton gave effect to various NAFTA provisions by issuing
Proclamation 6641 on December 15, 1993
duty-related provisions.255
President Trump, invoking Section 125(b) of The Trade Act of
1974, may be able to unilaterally terminate Proclamation 6641 in part
or in whole. 256 However, it is unlikely that the President has such
authority, particularly regarding a termination in whole. Proclamation
6641 was invoked in part pursuant to the Implementation Act, which

249

See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(a) (2016).
See id.
251 Id. § 2135(b).
252 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 242, at 5-6.
253
19 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(1)(A) (2016).
254 19 U.S.C. § 3332(q) (2016); see also Johnson, supra note 242, at 5.
255 Johnson, supra note 242, at 6; see also Proclamation No. 6641, 58
Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596 (Dec. 15, 1993).
256
See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (2016).
250
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specially provides for NAFTA-related tariff treatment. 257 Notably,
Section 125(b) only allows the President
any
proclamation made under this chapter
allows the President to terminate proclamations made pursuant to Title
19, Chapter 12 of the U.S. Code. 258 Therefore, Section 125(b) does
not apply to the Implementation Act, which is found in 19 U.S.C.
21.259 As a result, Section 125(b) cannot be used to terminate any parts
of Proclamation 6641 made pursuant to the Implementation Act, an
Act found in 19 U.S.C., Chapter 21 and not Chapter 12.
Furthermore, Proclamation 6641 was made pursuant to a number
of different U.S. Acts in addition to the Implementation Act, including
Sections 201 and 203 of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965
(19 U.S.C. 8) and Sections 1102(a) and 1204 of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 18).260 As discussed
above, Section 125(b) does not apply to either of these Acts because
they are enumerated outside 19 U.S.C. 12.261 Therefore, Section
125(b) cannot be used to terminate the parts of Proclamation 6641 that
were made pursuant to Acts found in 19 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 18, and
8, and not in Chapter 12.
Conceivably, President Trump could invoke Section 125(b) to
terminate the parts of Proclamation 6641 that were made pursuant to
Sections 504 and 604 of The Trade Act of 1974, which are found in 19
U.S.C. 2464(c) and 2483.262 However, this would be highly
impractical as it would frustrate the administration of NAFTA, anger
major confrontation with
Congress 263 Additionally, such in part termination of Proclamation

257

See Proclamation No. 6641, 58 Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596, 2596-98
(Dec. 15, 1993); see also Johnson, supra note 242, at 6.
258
19 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (2016) (emphasis added).
259
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 242, at 6.
260 See Proclamation No. 6641, 58 Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596, 2598 (Dec.
15, 1993); see also Johnson, supra note 242, at 6.
261
See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (2016).
262 See Proclamation No. 6641, 58 Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596, 2598 (Dec.
15, 1993); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c) (2016); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2483
(2016).
263
Johnson, supra note 242, at 6.
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6641 would ultimately have an insignificant effect on NAFTA as a
whole, especially regarding NAFTA-related tariff treatment.

President
instigating a resurgence of protectionist policies, is motived primarily
by his exclusive focus on the bilateral merchandise account trade
deficits that the U.S. runs with other countries. 264 This exclusive focus
makes little sense in an integrated globalized economy, putting the
-economics logic is simply
flawed, as he fails to take into account (1) the negative consequences
that increased trade barriers can have on American companies that
operate as part of international production chains and (2) the portion
of foreign country exports consisting of American made component
parts.265
President Trump erroneously sees bilateral merchandise account
deficits as the result of unfair foreign trade practices and not the result
of systemic economic forces. 266 According to Trump, these deficits
are the primary cause of U.S. manufacturing job loss and economic
disadvantage. 267 As such, Trump also believes that reversing these
trade deficits will re-open abandoned or transformed U.S.
manufacturing facilities and create a substantial volume of jobs.268 In
reality, trade deficits merely reflect a low savings rate relative to
consumption and investment rates, and are a function of these rates
more than of trade policy.269 Additionally, reversing trade deficits will
likely have little to no effect on manufacturing-sector employment
rates due to automation. 270 Furthermore, despite what President

264

See Dadush, supra note 39, at 5.
See id. at 5-7.
266 See id. at 2.
267 E.g., Don Lee, Why Trump's Obsession with Trade Deficits is
Misguided, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fitrade-deficit-trump-obsession-20170502-htmlstory.html.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270
Id.
265
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271

The Trump administration should be focused more on the size and
sustainability of global (i.e., not bilateral) current account balances,
which depend more on domestic spending than on trade policies. 272
Nevertheless, the administration remains fixed on bilateral
merchandise account deficits.273 As a result, it appears President
Trump is primarily concerned with the trade practices of four countries
in particular China, Germany, Japan, and Mexico because of the
large goods account surpluses they run with the U.S. (see Figure 1
below).274 However, as previously discussed, bilateral goods deficits
are only one of the important factors used by the Department of the
Treasury to identity unfair foreign trade practices. Neither China nor
Mexico have global current account surpluses in excess of 3 percent
of their GDPs. Additionally, none of these four countries is actively
intervening to decrease the value of its currency. 275
Based on his tradechief concern is to bring jobs, especially manufacturing jobs, back to
the U.S. However, the U.S. economy is near full employment as the
current unemployment rate has dropped to 4.4 percent, a 10-year
low.276
increases to infrastructure spending will increase domestic spending
and demand for goods further exacerbating the current account deficit
issue.277
at 2.5% of GDP and is no longer as big of a concern as it once was (in
271

E.g., Peter S. Goodman,
cit Obsession:
Deficient
Analysis,
N.
Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
5,
2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/business/trump-xi-trade-deficitchina.html?_r=0.
272
See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.
273
See id.
274 See id.; see also, Lee, supra note 267 (explaining that trade deficits
should not be the only benchmark for economic health).
275
See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.
276 BUREAU OF L ABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY
(2017)
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000.
277
See Dadush, supra note 39, at 3.
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GDP).278 In the short279

In the long280

Many
economists believe that advances in information and communication
technology and automation and not trade practices abroad are the
281
In fact, some have argued that as
much as 88% of U.S. manufacturing job losses between 2000 and 2010
were the result of advances in technology.282 These technological
advances allow manufacturing companies to produce more output with
less people (see Figure 2). 283
practices through unilateral trade action is based on irrational
assumptions and will likely prove futile.
Additionally, President Trump fails to properly consider the
negative consequences that will affect U.S. companies as a result of
his decision to increase trade barriers via unilateral action. What
Trump fails to see (or chooses to ignore) is that increasing tariffs or
other non-tariff barriers to trade on foreign imports functionally
284
imports consist of raw
This is a
particularly salient issue for companies like Boeing, whose supply
chains are extremely globally integrated (see Figure 3 below). 285

made up of raw materials, parts, and components originating in the

278

Id.; Current Account Balance (% of GDP), The World Bank: Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS?end=2016&lo
cat=&locations=US&start=1970&view=chart, (last visited Nov. 27, 2017).
279
See Dadush, supra note 39, at 3.
280 Id.
281
E.g., id.; see also, Lee, supra note 267.
282
See e.g., Michael J. Hicks and Srikant Devaraj, The Myth and Reality
of
Manufacturing
in
America,
BALL
S.U.
(2017),
http://conexus.cberdata.org/files/MfgReality.pdf.
283
Ben Casselman, Manufacturing Jobs Are Never Coming Back, FIVE
THIRTY -E IGHT (Mar. 18, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
manufacturing-jobs-are-never-coming-back/.
284 Dadush, supra note 39, at 2-3.
285
Id.
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United States.286 For example, it is estimated that about 40% of the
value of goods imported from Mexico is made in the U.S. (i.e., that 40
percent of imports from Mexico consist of parts and components
produced by American companies in the U.S.). 287 Similarly, various
with the U.S. is overstated by as much as 50% due to the significant
from component parts originally made in the U.S. and imported by
China.288 As a result of these economic realities, it is clear that
-economics logic is simply flawed.

286
287
288

See id.
Id.
Id.
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